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Abstract: 
Cohesion policy and regional policy as a main part of cohesion policy are the most important policies 
of European Union. This could also be view from the volume of financial resources allocated for these 
policies. One of the main current research issues is analyzing efficiency and effectiveness of these 
funds. Examining the effectiveness of funds we can see a number of shortcomings, from which are 
the most significant deadweight loss effect, subtitution effect, lack of application of the principles of 
partnership, administrative burden focused on expenses and not results or the low multiplier effects. 
We have analyzed several of them directly in the case study of some Slovak regions. 
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Theoretical background 
Regional  policy  is one of the most important policies of the European Union. It´s  based on its 
fundamental principles, among which we include the efforts of economic and social cohesion of the 
European area. Just regional policy is the most important part of cohesion policy. Volume of support, 
which leads to less-developed EU regions,  is very important for these regions. Between 2000 - 2006 
went to the regional policy more than 127 trillion. Euros, what  means more than 2% of annual GDP 
of the least  developed  countries (CEC  2004).  Most  analysis  on an aggregate level, identified the 
positive contribution of transfers from the Structural Funds (CEC 2004, Becker 2008, Nagy 2008). 
However,  there is  not  always  evident  link  between  these  transfers  and  the  region's  economic 
performance (Nordregio 2005). Some key questions remain - what are the effects of this support 
towards achieving the objectives which the regional policy sets and in particular how these goals are 
achieved from  the  perspective  of  maximizing  outcomes  in  minimizing  inputs.  It  is  therefore 
neccessary to achieve the efficiency and effectiveness of regional policy. The European Commission 
itself devote significant attention to the evaluationof the policy, what is done by a system of ex ante, 
interimand ex post evaluations.
In terms of efficiency, thus achieving real convergence of lagging regions, most studies support the 
argument of real convergence within the EU, although individual results vary considerably in extent 2
and scope of this convergence. With regard to real convergence within the EU, it can be seen at 
country level rather than at the regional level. Underdeveloped countries of the South have managed 
to  increase  the  convergence  towards  the  EU,  but  the  actual  differences  among  regions  within 
countires remained very strong (Cappelen et al. 2003). It runs as a potential conflict between the 
desire of the country's overall economic convergence, which is easier to achieve through the growth 
of more advanced regions and efforts to reduce regional disparities within the country itself (CEC 
2004). This conflict can be seenalsoin the case of the Slovak Republic. 
Significant successes in the use of EU regional policy, that countries such as Ireland and Portugal have 
achieved,  are  largely  caused  by  the fact  that  EU  regional policy  is  complementary  to  their  own 
regional policy. Thus, there was a synergistic effect, which was reflected in the positive development 
of their convergence with the EU developed countries. The problem is that in many new EU countries 
(including  Slovakia)  seeking  convergence absent  just such a n ational  policy  to  promote  regional 
development  (Buček  2009).  In  Hungary,  the  resources  used  for  regional  policy  nearly  equaled 
resources that were included in the national development plan for disbursement of EU aid (Nagy 
2008). A similar situation is in the Slovak and Czech Republic. It also appears that the effectiveness of 
EU regional policy is significantly better in regions that achieve a certain level of development. In 
regions, where it is most needed, it is already significantly less effective (Cappelen et al. 2003). In the 
macroeconomic context of the assessment of EU aid by the new member countries is needed to 
stress, that  these  countries   p assed significant  changes  in many  areas before. Access  processes 
forced many countries to change the legislative standards, which in most cases were positive for the 
country. The same can be said about the opening of European markets (free movement of capital 
and goods, and partly also work). By joining the EU has significantly increased their perception as 
economically and politically stable countries. Therefore it is very difficult to determine whether the 
positive  effects  of  convergence  were caused by these factors in this  period  rather  than  financial 
support from the EU. 
Most studies accept the fact that the efficiency of EU regional policy is on a relatively acceptable
level, but significantly  differ  over  the effectiveness of  European  regional  policy  (Ederveen  2007, 
Molle 2007, Wostner 2008, Nagy 2008, Bradley 2008). The reason is in particular extremely high 
demands onevaluation of its impact. Although it is possible to calculate, for example, how many jobs 
were created through supported projects, key issues are different - how would they originated, if 
supported projects were not implemented or how much they create, if they had used the allocated 
resources by other means (Molle 2007). These key issues of efficiency measurement are very difficult 
to  measure  aggregately,  because  of the  absence  of  alternative  scenarios.  In  implementing  the 
regional  policy  during  the programming  period,  there have been significant  changes  within  the 
various national factors such as demographic, legislative or tax changes, which assess the impact of 3
losing  usable  basis  for  evaluation.  Estimated  alternative  scenario  is then based on trends from 
previous years before applying for support or it is based on development of other regions that were 
not supported or on the development across the EU during certain period. Both approaches do not 
provide a satisfactory answer, as the development of the region would look like without support. The 
principal advantage of the macro model is an effort to affect externalities and  substitution effects, 
which are hardly reflected at the micro level (Bradley et al. 2005). This is largely the structure of the 
indicators that are set for individual projects. On the other hand, macroeconomic models have some 
disadvantages, as well. The key is in particular a number of conditions for their validity and the need 
for very detailed and often unavailable data, which force the use of artificial variables. EU regional 
policy also represents a very wide range of activities (from infrastructure, through science, to human 
resources),  which  is  almost  impossible  to  measure  by  using  existing  models (Martin  2006).  It  is 
important to mention about the role of retardation effects of the Structural Funds (Esposti 2008) and 
their difficult separability from other regional policy instruments. A large part of studies, addressing 
in particular the overall impact of the use of structural funds to the country by using the macro 
model may therefore focus only on the question of efficiency, but very problematic on the question 
of efficiency. Also its formulated conclusions rather rely on the fact that convergence occurs, and 
thus is an effective regional policy. But there is a convergence within the EU at times without a 
regional policy, as well. EU regional policy, however, should be mainly focused on the level of regions 
and its effects on them, so also in the empirical part we will focus on specific microstudies effects of 
EU support for regional development. Such microstudies may also provide an alternative approach to 
evaluating the effectiveness of regional policy, although we can not answer the key question of the 
effectiveness of regional policy, but allow to point out specific places and processes where this policy 
is not effective and therefore identify possible improvements in the functioning of regional policy. 
This  approach is  also  useful,  because the objectives  of  regional  policy  are largely  political,  not 
economic agenda and thus from an economic point of view is more important question of improving 
the effectiveness of this policy as a question of whether regional policy is economically efficient. 
This  approach also  confirms  the  expenditure  of  the Structural  Funds,  which  are  not the primary 
source  of  economic  growth,  but  they  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  quality  of  life  such  as 
investments improving population access to drinking water (Marais 2006). In the last programming 
period,  there  where  more  expenditure  aimed at improving  the  quality  of  life  for  residents  as 
measures to stimulate economic growth (CEC 2010). However, this has direct implications especially 
towards the measuring process of the regions maturity. For the purposes of regional policy is a key 
indicator GDP per capita, which is the only criterion for inclusion region among the least developed. 
Backward  regions are then  indirectly  encouraged  to  focus  only  on  improving  the quality  of  life 
without the effects towards their competitiveness, what ensure support for the next programming 4
period. To fully assess the effectiveness seems to be necessary to create a combined system, which 
would be able to integrate so macro-model "top-down" approach as well micro-impact "bottom-up" 
approach (Bradley et al. 2005). 
Effectiveness  can  be  seen  from  two  perspectives.  The  first is the  effectiveness  of  regional  policy 
focus.  Here,  the  crucial  question  is how  resources  are  redistributed  among  the  priorities  and 
assessment of optimization of the distribution resources between priorities. This task is very difficult 
and its  solution is very individual  for  each  country.  Completed  research studies so far  have  not 
proposed a model that would help resolve this issue. There are thus only partial studies. Bradley 
(2005) in his study estimated the average elasticity of infrastructure projects to 0.33 and the average 
elasticity of projects aimed at human capital to 0.27, but allows certain problems in interpretations 
any conclusions.  Difficult content  rating is complicated by the fact, that  the  EU's  regional  policy 
intervention include many areas, from infrastructure, through innovation, tourism, human capital, to 
environmental  projects.  They  are made by  number  of  different  schemes and instruments,  each 
country has its own, often without the institutional environment for their implementation (Bachtler 
2006). This is confirmed by different approaches of individual countries, where support drawing had 
been very individual. For example, Ireland spent in 2000-06 29.5% of all expenditure to infrastructure  
in comparison with the period 1994-99, when it spent only 19.7%. By contrast, Spain between 2000-
06 exerted  28.1% of  all expenditure  to  infrastructure  in comparison  with  40.1%  in the  previous 
period  (Kamps  2009).  Due to  the many  different  and  often  conflicting  objectives and priorities,
decision on the choice becomes a political decision (CEC 2010). 
The  second approach,  to  which  we will  pay more attention in this work,  is about the forms  of 
regional policy measures. In this case, it is about the processes  and tools  in implementing regional 
policy, where it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of concrete activities. 
Regional policy EU in Slovakia 
Slovak Republic entering the EU has also begun to use the tools and capabilities of its regional policy. 
The first period of the aid was accounted for 2004 - 2006, which were in terms of spending and 
absorption  of  aid extremely  difficult, as  demonstrated  by  the  extension  options  of  funds  remake 
compared to traditional rule n+2. Currently Slovakia draws assistance under the National Strategic 
Reference Framework (NSRF) for the years 2007 - 2013. From the perspective of the NSRF and the EU 
regional  policy  whole Slovak  Republic,  in addition to  Bratislava  region,  falls  under  Objective  1.            
In  terms  of  territorial concentration  of  assistance,  regional  policy  of  the  country  has significantly 
different preferences as EU regional policy. This problem is very heavily affected in particular regional 
policy and strategy  formulation  of  regional  development, since  this area represents  much  bigger
volume of resources provided from the EU as the amount of money spent by Slovak Republic. This 5
has resulted in spending  a large part  of  the state budget  on  co-financing  activities  set by the 
European regional policy, and other activities in regional development suffer from a lack of financial 
resources (Buček 2009). This is exacerbated by the fact, that the level of NUTS II, which is crucial for 
the implementation  of  regional  policies  from  the perspective of  the EU,  in Slovakia  is set just 
administrative and real regional structures are set only at NUTS III level. This model thus may be 
functional only when coming on strong consensus in the EU and the country priorities. Then the large 
volume  of  resources  of  EU  regional  policy,  which  is  needed  to  run  out, is able to accelerate the 
national resources of the country and thus the total volume of resources for key priorities increases. 
The  territorial  dimension  is  missing  in  the system and operational programs,  which are strongly 
sector-oriented. In the field of integrated programs, there are only a first and very limited attempts. 
This  is in sharp conflict with the stated goals  of  EU  cohesion policy  (CEC  2004).  The  territorial 
dimension of support should also emphasize innovative and cohesive growth poles and their areas of 
interest, which have been defined for the programming period as optimal areas for concentration 
support. In Slovakia is their number very high and in real only in minimally affect the possibility to 
apply for  funding  (Buček  2009).  Territorial  concentration  itself  is also largely hampered by the 
relatively artificial system  of  NUTS  II  regions.  Examples are the regions of  Bratislava and  Prague, 
which significantly  dominate at  NUTS  II  level,  but  only  because  of,  for  example,  Budapest.  In 
Budapest was created bigger NUTS II region, so that Budapest was able to draw assistance under 
Objective 1. Also Bratislava would draw this help, if it would be administratively at NUTS II associated 
with the Trnava region. Moreover, in some countries have occured changes in the NUTS II level, so 
the current programming period already has a different spatial arrangement of aid than the previous 
one. 
Administrative burden of project implementation does not add to the efficiency of the support. In 
OIR studies (2003) only one third of respondents identified implementation systems of structural 
funds to be flexible sufficiently. Format of the projects insome calls also represents more than 60% 
selection of the projects. This limits the choice of the best projects. Also it leads to discourage many 
potential candidates for support. This problem, however, concerns not only the Slovak Republic (CEC 
2004).  Another  inefficiency  of  spending  structural  funds  due to administrative  complexity  is also 
reflected in the actual implementation of projects, in this case in particular for projects financed by 
the European Social Fund. Limits on administrative and project management are limited to 20% of 
direct expenditure, applicants use this opportunity as much as possible and the experience of project 
implementation shows, that this volume particularly in smaller projects is still not sufficient. This, 
however, in terms of efficiency leads to the fact, that actually a fifth of the spent funds is not directed 
at identified priorities. In addition, in this are not included costs for the programs, i.e. management 
and  intermediary  bodies expenditure.  Taking  into  account  more  than  1  billion.  million  for  ESF 6
projects, then approximately 150 million. EUR can achieve indirect costs. If appropriate measures 
have reduced administrative costs by 5%, we will acquire 7.5 million. Euros. It would suffice, for 
example,to train 25 000 unemployed people in computer skills. 
Part of the administrative difficulty is caused by the extremely high level of control. Some expenses 
may be assessed in form of control or audit even ten times (Wostner 2008). This not only leads to 
high financial demands on control systems, but also to significant time losses. In the programming 
period 2004-2006 in the recovery of expenditure on projects supported by the ESF almost never 
complied the  terms  and conditions  relating  to  that  time  commitment  for  reimbursement  of  the 
funds. In a survey sample of 20 projects funded by ESF, which we approached, only two had any 
problems caused by delays in payments. For other projects that significantly affect the quality of the 
project  as  well as its  effectiveness.  For  example  4 project  applicants  were forced  to  arrange  a 
bridging loan bank, which means additional financial and time costs for them. This ambitious scheme 
would be able to be justifiable, if it was able to ensure efficient and effective control. However, as 
practice  shows,  this  system  is  not  functional sufficiently.  According  to  the  European  Court  of 
Auditors,  at least 12% reimbursement in the structural funds  projects  throughout  the  European 
Union  in 2006 should  not  be reimbursed  (European  Court  of  Auditors  2007).  Most  incorrect  or 
ineligible  expenditure  is  no  intent,  but  precisely  because  of  constant  changes  in  the  rules  or 
inattention stemming from very high administrative cost of implementation. One of the other factors 
affecting this difficulty is requiring the same conditions and procedures for small and large projects. 
Differentiation of this approach was also one of the recommendations of the study OIR (2003). By 
division  of  these processes  could  be  achieved  simpler administrative  burden  on  smaller  projects. 
Administrative difficulty reduces the total possibilities of depletion of allocated resources, what is 
another significant factor. Several countries did not use the full possibilities provided to them (Mili 
2007). 
Problem of efficiency, or rather the effectiveness of regional policy from another perspective is also a 
"deadweight". About it we can speak, if the projects would be fully or partially implemented without 
the  support  from  the  European  Union,  as  well. Several  authors  try  to  measure  „deadweight 
spending“of  expenditure  programmes  focusing  on  regional  development  policies.    Accurate  data 
monitoring this effect are rather limited. Several studies suggest, that the amount of funds provided 
in this way  is very  high  and ranges  between  40 to  80%.  Lenihah  (2004)  estimates  „deadweight 
spending“ for Irish industrial policy programmes on the level of  40 - 80% from total provided sum of 
grants.  Leninahn  and  H art  (2004,)  estimated also  for  Irish  conditions  is  42,6  – 55,8%.  Tokila 
andHaapanen (2009) estimate in the case of Finish business support policies is 31,9%. The study in 
the UK  pointed  to  about  20%  of  projects,  that would  be  carried  out  without this support (Wren 
2005). Study for Italy showed 50% effect of deadweight (CEC 2010). Therefore it is about a very 7
significant effects that influence the effectiveness of aid. So it is necessary to define better conditions 
under which the private sector should benefit from EU support instruments.
In terms of generating public investment, however, empirical studies rather point to the fact that 
regional policy significantly increased the amount of money spent on developing investment projects 
by individual Member States. Austrian expenditure increased after the entry by 36%, Sweden 14%. In 
Ireland it was 66% and in Greece it was 24% (Marais 2006). What is more, these expenses are due to 
the  need  of  co-financing  projects  protected  from  budget  cuts,  thereby  developing  momentum 
carried in the budget challenging times. As demonstrate some knowledge of ex post analysis of the 
ERDF  2000-06  (CEC  2010),  increase spending  may  be  inefficient.  For  example  in  Poland  were 
identified projects, that were unnecessarily large (e.g. sewages) and their outcomes have not been 
fully exploited . It is likely, that in some cases are being prepared "projects to the projects", so that 
available EU funds could be used. The effectiveness of their use is not a fundamental question for a 
given country or region, because the rate of co-financing made by The EU is very high. The same can 
be observed in some educational projects in Slovakia, where the degree of necessity of all training 
(particularly in government) is not sufficiently substantiated in analysis. 
We can also perceive  differences  between  declared  principles  of  the European  Union  and their 
application at national and project level. While at the national level principles are often applied, at 
project level it is substantially worse. An example may be the lack of integrated programs, as well as 
a very limited use of the principle of partnership in the projects themselves, in many cases it is even 
not allowed. An example may be the inability of schools to bring a joint project, that would upgrade 
their department or specialty. That is why many projects are carried out by one applicant and have 
no additional synergies. It is important to emphasize, that the principle of partnership is considered 
to be one of the cornerstones of improving local governance and partnership level (Marais 2006). 
Strict application  of  the  financial  management  principles at the expense of  content  effectiveness 
leads to a large formal guidelines to do things correctly, compared to doing the right thing. This is 
partly related  to  the  preference  of  quantity  before quality  in  the  projects. Projects are primarily 
evaluated  using  the  obtained  values  of  measurable  indicators,  which  are  quantitatively  for  all 
operational programs. Although in the process of evaluation takes into account the quality, at this 
stage it is only declared quality, not achieved. In the implementation phase, when we are talking 
about the real outputs quality, however, still dominated quantitative assessment through the set 
indicators performance. 
Against the principle of partnership is still centralized system of management of structural funds. 
While in the period 2004-2006, this system has been implemented in the most new member states,
which did not have sufficiently strong regional capacity to manage the implementation process, in 
this programming  period  we can see a move towards a regional  level in some countries.  Polish 8
regions  have  decided  by  about  30%  of  EU  assistance  funds  (Bachtler  2007).  Slovak  Republic, 
however, still remains on a centralized level. Some studies support this centralization, arguing that 
just few regions can be able to manage the aid effectively (Lovering 1999). Similar Milio study (2007) 
pointed to differences in administrative capacity of regions and their impact on the ability of the 
funds drawing. The European Commission itself (CEC 2004, Bachtler 2007) sees as one of the key 
indirect effects  of  structural  funds  their  impact  on  strengthening  the  institutional  capacity  of 
underdeveloped regions, which will be able to manage other development and support processes
effectively, and experience shows that this strengthening occur indeed (Nordregio 2005). This view 
can be supported even in a case of the new member countries, which thanks to the EU have devoted 
more attention to the processes of decentralization and regional policy. These processes were not 
conducted or were conducted in a very limited basis without the possibility of EU funds using.
One of the factors, that may affect an impact of the regional aid instruments use is also the question 
in what extent backward regions benefit from the resources intended for their development. If we 
proceed  from  the principle  of  concentrating  resources as one of the preferred principles  of  EU 
support, the more resources will be used in the region of support and the larger multiplier effects 
they develop, the more effective is the regional policy. Multiplier effects are important element of 
efficiency in the operation of the Structural Funds, but the theoretical literature has given them very 
little attention. According to Bradley (2006) macroeconomic study, ex ante calculated cumulative 
multiplier (calculated as the cumulative increase in GDP/cumulative share SF on GDP) for aid for the 
programming  period  2007  to  2013  with  the  overall  impact  for  2020  is  between  0,9-2,8,  while 
significant  multiplier  effects  of  structural  funds  are expected  in  the  new  member  countries. 
According to Becker (2008), each EURO from the Structural Funds create 1,21 EUR multiplier effects. 
Similar findings also exist in the ex ante calculationfor Slovakia, when the multiplier ranged between 
1,1 to 1,8 (Kvetan 2006). 
Case study of the Banska Bystrica region
For the analysis of the EU grants micro-impacts we have taken analysis of the projects in the Banska 
Bystrica region. In Slovakia this region belongs to the regions covered by Objective 1, together with 
the Presov and Kosice region. Region itself is differentiated, the northern part is relatively mature 
with unemployment rates below the national average. In contrast, the southern part belongs to the 
regions with the highest unemployment rate in Slovakia. 
For studying the impact of the structural funds, we have analyzed projects in several areas supported 
under  the Banska  Bystrica  region. The  aim of  research  was to identify  the funds  distribution in 
projects, that remain directly in the region and funds, which are moved outside the target region or 9
returned through taxes or levies back to the state. In the research we have examined various types of 
projects implemented by different types of beneficiaries. 
In the private sector, we evaluated two specific challenges - measure 1.1. OP Industry and Services
(OP PaS) and measure 1.1 OP Competitiveness and economic growth (OP KaHR). In both cases it was 
about  the  purchase  and  transfer  of  innovative  technologies.  Analysis  was  performed  on  all  25 
projects supported in the Banska Bystrica region, the data wasn´tobtained from one company.
Table 1:The percentage of primary expenditure transfer of innovation projects 
SOP PaS OP KaHR
supplier producer supplier producer
Banska Bystrica region (BBSK) 6.82 0 7.49 1.6
Bratislava region (BSK) 29,48 5,83 13,03 0
Other regions outside the  BSK and BBSK 24,76 8,54 42,21 15,26
Foreign 38,94 85,63 37,27 83,14
Source: Own processing on the basis of completed projects
As can be seen from Table. 1, most of the expenses involved in purchasing technology ultimately 
ended in abroad. It  therefore  appears that for  these activities,  we  can talk about the  return  of 
significant resources to the more advanced EU regions, which are producers of modern technology. 
Mainly dominated purchases from Germany, followed by Italy, the Czech Republic and Austria. This 
type of project is without any multiplier effects, which were caused by the implementation of part of 
expenses directly in the region. Slovak entities often serve as a mediator. The reason of the reduced 
possibility of multiplier effects is that the Slovak Republic is very limited technological equipment 
manufacturer. More than 25% of resources were allocated to the backward regions of the Czech 
Republic, which, unlike Slovakia have in this respect better economic activity.
The situation was quite different in the case of OP Basic Infrastructure projects, where we analyzed 
the measure school infrastructure. Together we evaluated 23 supported projects. In this case, more 
than 73%  of  funds  were  allocated  to  firms  in  the region,  10,5%  were allocated  to the Bratislava 
region and 16,5% were allocated to the remaining counties. With this measure the multiplier effects 
were significantlygreater than in the first case. 
As a last we analyzed measure 1.1 Conversion of traditional to modern school in the Operational 
Programme  Education.  In  this  case, it  was  unlike  previous  measures,  non-investment  projects 
supported by the European Social Fund. Here, compared to other measures,create a strong back line 
the flow of subsidies to the state budget as part of the budget are the cost of human resources. 10
In the Banska Bystrica region in this case the most resources remains directly in the region (61%), the 
second largest volume were revenues of state budget, social and health insurance (23%) and a small 
percentage of resources ended directly in abroad (1,5%). Even here the situation is changing, when 
taking  into  account  the  end-producers,  though  ends  in  developed  countries  10%  of  financial 
allocation in this  case. Different  types of measures have significantly  different  direct multiplier 
effects. Through  these  measures  part  of  the  funding  return to  developed  regions,  thus  the 
concentration of aidis reduced significantly. 
Deadweight effect is also present in the case of Slovakia. We analyzed two groups of the projects.
First group consists of projects, whose obtained enough points to be supported, but lack of financial 
resources did not allow to do that. Second group were supported projects. All projects were of the 
schemes were designed to purchase innovative technologies. We took into account only the criterion 
of the volume of financial resources that would be incurred in case of failure to obtain funding.
First  group  were projects from  scheme „for  industry  and services – measure 1.1  – Transfer  of 
Innovation“ Together, 80 projects were scored enough high, but did not obtain financial support. We 
surveyed 18 enterprises, which represents 22,5%. Results are shown in table 2. There were mainly 
two edge situation, most of the companies either did not realized proposed project or realized it in 
full content as proposed. All of the companies, whose have less than 3 years of existence, answered, 
they wont realized project without EU support.
Table 2: Results of deadweight loss effect (unsupported projects)
Length  of  company 
existence
Project  will  be 
realize  without  EU 
support (%)
Project  will  not  be 
realize  without  EU 
support 
Deadweight  loss 
effect 
Less than 3 years 0 4 0%
More than 3 years 2 (100%), 1 (50%) 11 16,67%
Together 3 15 13,88%
Source: own calculation based on own survey
The  second  group  are  projects  that  have  received  support  from  the  scheme  de  minimis  OP 
Competitiveness  and economic  growth.  Under  these schemes were supported 151 projects, the 
answers we received from 35, representing a 23.17% share. 
Table 2. Results of deadweight loss effect (supported projects)
Length  of  company 
existence
Project  will  be 
realize  without  EU 
support (%)
Project  will  not  be 
realize  without  EU 
support 
Deadweight  loss 
effect 11
Less than 3 years 1 (20%),1 (50%) 5 10%
More than 3 years
5 (100%), 7 (50%), 1 
(30%),  1  (35%),  2 
(25%),  1  (20%),  1 
(70%), 1  (40%) 9
39,11%
Together 21 14 33,28%
Source: own calculation based on own survey
We again found that new enterprises achieve lower deadweight effect than existing ones. The total 
deadweight loss were higher than in previuos case. There could be several explanations. One of the 
possibilities is  „paradox of good choice“. The most of evalautors tried to select „the best projects“ 
and do not reflect real requirements and real neccessarity of public support.
Tabuľka 3: Results of deadweight loss effect (all projects)
Length  of  company 
existence
Project  will  be 
realize  without  EU 
support (%)
Project  will  not  be 
realize  without  EU 
support 
Deadweight  loss 
effect 
Less than 3 years 1 (20%),1 (50%) 9 6,36%
More than 3 years
7 (100%), 8 (50%), 1 
(30%),  1  (35%),  2 
(25%),  1  (20%),  1 
(70%), 1  (40%) 20
27,73%
Together 24 29 23,30%
Source: own calculation based on own survey
The total deadweight effect is quite low compare to similar studies abroad. One of the reasons could 
be economy crise, which lead to lower investment of the companies.
Conclusions 
After  joining  Slovakia  gained  the  possibility  of  using  regional  policy  resources,  which  represent a 
much larger volume of support than has hitherto used for such activities. This use is not completely 
ideal and for taking out you can see a few critical points. Drawing on an examination of the use of 
structural funds for the Slovak Republic would be necessary to consider some adjustments relating to 
to the rules oftheir utilization. 
1, Targeting on SMEs, specially new companies
The deadweight effect was much lower in projects of the new companies than in other projects. 
Many  existing  companies  applying  for  the  grants  just  as  a possibility  to  finance  their  regular 
investment  or  education  activities.  New  businesses  also  have  a more positive  impact  on  the 12
competitive environment, and their support, on the contrary, this environment does not interfere 
significantly. 
2, Simplifying the administrative burden 
One  important  measure  is to simplify the administrative  burden.  In  this  area  there  are several 
options. One of them is the use of percentage of indirect expenses that would not be needful to 
recognize. Such a model has been successfully running for some international projects of the EU. 
Interesting is also thought to realize the performance of intermediary bodies with procurement as it 
is  for  example  in  the  UK  (Nagy  2008),  which  could  be a  real  appraisal  of  prices  of  projects 
administration and thus make it more effective. Linked to this is fact, more attention should be given 
to the outputs and not to the costs of projects. We are also missingy micro-studies, which compared 
the  effectiveness  of  individual  measures.  As  some  studies  pointed,  these  measures  have  very 
different effects on the development of individual regions. 
3, The increased involvement of partners and local institutions 
Positive effect would also be an effort to create multiplier effects of projects promoting the use of 
local resources under certain conditions. In Slovakia, in this programming period, are only tested 
strategies  for  a  comprehensive  approach and just drawing of  these  projects  is lagging  most.  The
partnership principle is also very limited used. Especially with the "soft" projects, the partnership 
effects,  whether  in  project  implementation  or  dissemination  of  outcomes,  would  result  in  a 
significant increase in the effectiveness of regional policy. With this also implies the complexity of 
projects, where there is  a  comprehensive local  project,  reflecting the  region's  needs  in  different 
areas, which complement each other and create synergies. The possibility of such projects should 
have  significantly  positive  impact  already  in  the  pipeline  project,  which  would  require  the 
cooperation of all interested institutions and thereby strengthen the ability of regional "governance". 
4, System of project selection 
One of the open questions is a system of project selection. Experience shows that "eligible" projects 
(projects, where contribution get each in compliance with conditions, for example - grants to newly 
opened trade for long-term unemployed) have a much lower administrative costs and often higher 
achieved effects. Their big advantage is significantly lower threat of the corruption, as well. From
number of projects for the private sector, large companies in developed regions are in favor, because 
they have better resources and information for project preparation and also for possible corruption. 
This should be considered, especially if the aim of regional policy is the support of backward regions.
These suggestions could be supported also be results of deadweight loss measurement, which shows 
much  higher  deadweight  in  better  projects  (scoring  high  in  the  evaluation  process)  than   w orser 
projects (scoring lower, but still sufficient for be considered as supportable). This lead to „paradox of 13
good choice“  -  The public institution tends to support „best projects“ instead of „best projects, that 
need an assistance“. 
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